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1 
Humanomics Spans the Two Worlds of Adam Smith 
Sociality and Economy 
A persistent conflict in modern human life arises from living simulta-
neously in two worlds governed by distinct rule systems. Human beings 
are first governed by the caring other-regarding rules of our close-knit 
social groups, like our families, extended families, neighbors, and friends. 
We do good things for such people, and we refrain from doing bad things 
to such people because we personally know them. On an individual level, 
we specifically know how to be helpful, kind, and compassionate to them. 
They have names like Candace and Ryan, Stephanie and Steve, Caroline 
and Kyle, and we have firsthand knowledge about them. We know such 
mundane things as which friend can take which jokes (and which ones 
cannot take jokes at all) and such poignant things as what our neighbor 
needs right now is someone to sit with while she copes with some trauma-
tizing news. With love and solidarity we treat those people personally 
known to us as the dear individuals they are. 
Because we cannot possibly know the specific circumstances of everyone 
beyond our circle of kith and kin, the extended order of markets treats 
everyone we do not personally know precisely the same. We do not 
personally know which farmer or wholesaler or trucker or grocer will 
best serve us in delivering food from the farm to our kitchen table, so we 
open it up for competition to decide who will serve us well. Wisconsinites, 
Kansans, Canadians, Mexicans, Chileans, New Zealanders, Czechs, and 
even the French all vie to supply us with what we desire: cheese and wheat, 
pork and tomatoes, grapes and kiwis, beer and wine. The same rules apply 
to everyone whom we do not personally know - do not harm by stealing, 
deceiving, or breaching a promise - and we let freedom of choice among 
them, called competition, do the rest. Whoever supplies the tastiest cheese 
at the best prevailing prices gets our money. Today that might be Robert 
Wills from Cedar Grove Cheese in Plain, Wisconsin, but next week it 
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might be Will and Hilary Chester-Master from Abbey Home Farm in 
Cirencester, United Kingdom. If specifying the actual names of cheese-
makers googled from the Internet feels a bit too particular, that is our 
point. We do not personally know the names of the multitudes of people 
who produce the far greater part of those daily goods and services we stand 
in need of. 
If the solidarity and love for our fellow compatriots that we do not 
personally know led us to forbid the importation of goods from other 
producers that we also do not personally know - say, like those in Asia or 
Europe - we would destroy the ability of markets to support specialization 
and thereby create wealth and human betterment. Such conflict promi-
nently takes the form of sharp controversies over inequality in the dis-
tribution of income and wealth, and whether or to what extent wealth 
creation generates inequality through innovation and the subsequent dif-
fusion of its benefits.1 
Similarly, applying impersonalized rules of competition, like that of 
"today you win my patronage, tomorrow you lose" to our more intimate 
social groupings would crush the ability of friends, family, and neighbors 
to forge and strengthen the bonds of human sociality. Imagine how many 
friends we would have if we treated them like we treat the owners of 
restaurants that we patronize: No, I'm sorry, your taste in wine is not 
a good fit for dinner this week; the Johnsons are coming over. Maybe next 
week, though? "So," says the economist and social philosopher F. A. Hayek, 
"we must learn to live in two sorts of world at once" (1988, p. 18). 
Although Hayek articulated the idea of living in two different worlds, 
and the conflict it engenders, the origin, substance, and functioning of 
these two parallel worlds was made comprehensible originally in two books 
written over two centuries ago by Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments in 1759 (hereafter Sentiments in the text, and TMS in citations) 
and An Inquiry into the Na tu re and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 177 6 
(hereafter Wealth in the text, and WN in citations). We use the neologism 
"humanomics" to refer narrowly here to the study of the very human 
problem of simultaneously living in these two worlds, the personal social 
and the impersonal economic. 
In the roots of their common origin in human life, Adam Smith's work 
enables us to understand these two worlds as one. He modeled both worlds 
in a manner that we believe seamlessly connects the two in a unified social 
and ethical science of human beings. It is our aim to further develop, 
1 Thomas Piketty (2014) and Deirdre McCloskey (2016). 
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articulate, and demonstrate that model for contemporary social science 
theory and experiment. Sentiments did not fare well in the academy; 
Wealth fared far better. The two works were once even seen as contra-
dictory. Jacob Viner, for example, a leading scholar in the intellectual 
history of economics, could write, "But it can be convincingly demon-
strated, I believe, that on the points at which they come into contact there is 
a substantial measure of irreconcilable divergence between the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations with respect to the character 
of the natural order" (Viner 1991, p. 93). And again, "Many writers, 
including the present author at an early stage of his study of Smith, have 
found these two works in some measure inconsistent" (Viner 1991, p. 250). 
This so-called Adam Smith problem was corrected in a revisionist litera-
ture that greatly elevated the status of Smith's first book.2 These corrections 
in the intellectual understanding of Smith, coming two centuries after 
Wealth was published, and a century after the neoclassical marginal revo-
lution do not close the immense gap between how Smith and modern 
scholars think about human action. 3 Our own experience is that of having 
stumbled into a gradually deepening appreciation of the unifying princi-
ples of social science in Smith's two great works. That path began and 
received illumination from unanticipated and unpredicted results in 
experimental studies. First in markets, where the standard self-interest 
model of action under strict private information predicted outcomes far 
more accurately than was thought possible by contemporary professional 
economists; and second, the same utility maximizing model of action in 
simple ultimatum and trust games failed decisively to predict 
2 Leonidas Montes (2003, 2004) examines this literature and other aspects of Smith's 
thought. 
3 
In the last edition of Sentiments, Smith stated that in the first edition he had indicated his 
intention "to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the 
different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not 
only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever 
else is the object of law. In ... [Wealth] ... I have partly executed this promise .... What 
remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been 
hindered from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me from 
revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little 
expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have 
not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of 
doing what I can, I have allowed the paragraph to remain as it was published more than thirty 
years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to execute every thing which it 
announced" (Adam Smith 1790). We do not know whether that plan, if followed, would 
have brought a fuller integration of Smith's remarkable two books, and a less ambitious 
attempt by neoclassical economists to reduce all human action to an exercise in utility 
maximization. 
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systematically replicable results.4 This book is largely a consequence of our 
attempt to give meaning to this disjunction, where none of the attempts to 
do so have been satisfactory. Sentiments gave us an unexpectedly fresh 
framework. 
SOCIAL ORDER 
Contrary to popular belief, Adam Smith does not argue, famously or 
infamously, that humans are primarily motivated by self-interest. Even in 
Wealth, he speaks not of self-interest but of one's "own interest," which 
includes prudence but is always mediated by what "other men can go along 
with."5 Smith renownedly says that "it is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity 
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of 
their advantages" (WN, pp. 26-7, our italics).6 But acting in one's "own 
interest,, need not entail putting one's own interest above another's interest 
in commerce, which is what acting with self-interest quite fundamentally 
means then and now. In Sentiments Smith often uses "selfish" to clearly 
demark the narrower meaning of self-interest. 
A deeper reading of Wealth reveals Smith's qualification of the meaning 
of"own interest." Appealing to the self-love of the butcher, the brewer, and 
the baker means "allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own 
way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" (WN, p. 664, our 
italics). If that qualification is unpersuasive, he elaborates later when 
discussing competition: "Every man, as long as he does not violate the 
laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own 
way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those 
of any other man, or order of men" (WN, p. 687, our italics). As part of 
acting in one's own interest, we, like the political theorist Ryan Hanley, 
read Adam Smith as having a commitment to the equality and dignity of all 
4 F. A. Hayek (1945) is an exception; the results from market experiments demonstrate 
Hayek's interpretation of the role of prices in coordinating economic activity. See Vernon 
Smith (1982). 
5 Tellingly, book 5 in volume 2 of Wealth is the first and last time Smith uses the word "self-
interest," and then it is to describe "the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy [in Rome]" 
(p. 789). 
6 In the same paragraph, preparing us for this quotation, we find an echo from Sentiments: 
"In civilized society he (man) stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance 
of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few 
persons ... and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only" (WN, p. 26). 
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people.7 Thus, if the modern economist espouses naked self-interest as the 
foundation for economic decision-making, she does so incompatibly with 
the founder of the discipline and more generally with the genius of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. There are moral rules, just rules, that govern our 
conduct in impersonal markets. 
Smith's friend David Hume likewise circumscribes market behavior 
within rules when he distinguishes interested commerce (what the eco-
nomic historian Douglass North calls impersonal or market exchange) 
from disinterested commerce (what North calls personal or social 
exchange).8 Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language, pub-
lished in 1755, offers four meanings for interest in eighteenth-century 
usage; while the first meaning of interest is "concern, advantage, good," 
the fourth meaning, which applies here, is "regard to private profit."9 
Hume recognizes that promises were invented for interested commerce 
to "bind ourselves to the performance of any action" (1740, p. 335). While 
with disinterested commerce we "may still do services to such person as 
I love, and am more particularly acquainted with, without any prospect of 
advantage; and they may make me a return in the same manner, without 
any view but that of recompensing my past services," the same is not true of 
our impersonal intercourses. We precisely engage in mutually benefiting 
and impersonal exchange for the distinct prospect of a private profit, and 
we voluntarily do so only with promises, "the sanction of interested 
commerce of mankind" (p. 335). 
Smith's first and lesser known work Sentiments is a deep and insightful 
study in disinterested commerce that creates human social betterment and 
also explains the origin of justice. In Wealth we learn that the pursuit of 
private benefit, under the governing rules of justice, is what enables 
specialization and wealth creation for human economic betterment. 
Smith sees these two forms of human betterment as the result of gradual 
socioeconomic development. In this our project dovetails with Deirdre 
McCloskey's grander narrative in Bourgeois Equality (2016, pp. 203-4): 
Smith had two invisible hands, two outcomes of (in his uncharacteristically clumsy 
phrase) "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty." One was the invisible 
hand of the marketplace, whose effects are occasionally noted in [Wealth]. For 
example, to mention Smith's most original economic contribution, the market-
place in labor equalizes the wage-plus-conditions in Scotland with those in 
England, within social and legal limits, because people move from one place to 
7 See Ryan Hanley (2009) and also Samuel Fleischacker (2004). 
8 Douglass North (1990, 2005). 9 Samuel Johnson (1755). 
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the other until it is so, as though directed by an invisible hand. Likewise the 
invisible hand gently pushes people out of their solipsistic cocoons to consider 
what is valued in trade by other people. "Every individual ... neither intends to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it." ... 
[The other was the invisible hand of the impartial spectator,] the social one as 
against the economic. We become polite members of our society by interacting on 
the social stage - note the word, "inter-acting." Smith in [Sentiments] did not 
believe, as his teacher Hutcheson did, that in achieving social peace and prosperity 
we can depend on natural benevolence .... Nor did he believe, as many economists 
still understand him to do, in a fuzzy version of Mandeville' s hardwired opposite of 
cooperation, a macho competiveness, greed is good. 
Against inherited niceness or nastiness, as I have noted, Smith repeatedly empha-
sized in [Sentiments], as he did also in [Wealth], that during their lives people 
change, shaped by society and, it may be, by their own impartial spectator. In the 
phrase appropriate to a time of apprenticeships, people were "brought up to a trade." 
Smith's aim in Sentiments is to understand how and why personal forms of 
other-regarding or moral action emerge and are sustained in our more 
intimate groupings and constitute the substance of human sociality. It is 
a work in psychology and economics applied to social interaction well 
before either had been established as independent fields of inquiry. Smith 
was yet to write Wealth, often identified with the founding of economics, 
but it would take another 125 years for psychology to be founded as 
separate and distinct from philosophy. To understand Sentiments we 
must learn the meaning conveyed in the eighteenth-century words and 
concepts Smith used, thereby enabling us to learn to think in his language, 
important in engaging the substance of his thought, the topic of Chapter 2. 
SENTIMENTS PREDICTS WHERE THE NEOCLASSICAL 
MODEL FAILS 
Neoclassical economics, with its firm methodological foundations in utility 
maximization ("Max-U''), received unexpectedly strong evidential support 
from the study of experimental markets beginning in the 1960s.10 In these 
experiments participants are identified as either buyers or sellers in a series 
of trading periods. Buyers are assigned private values for units of the item 
they could buy or attempt to buy in each trading period. Multiple units 
have declining values reflecting diminishing marginal utility - the key 
10 So abbreviated and further discussed by Deirdre McCloskey (2006). The original experi-
ments are reported in Vernon Smith (1962); see Douglas Davis and Charles Holt (1993) 
for a summary of the many subsequent such experiments; for a discussion of why the 
results were "surprising," see Vernon Smith (2008a, pp. 193-197). 
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contribution of the neoclassical marginal revolution.11 A buyer earns 
a profit on each unit purchased from a seller equal to the difference 
between the value to the buyer and the price paid for the item. Sellers are 
assigned units with values representing their cost of supplying units to the 
market. Sellers' profits are the difference between selling price and personal 
cost. Hence, buyers are motivated to buy at low prices, and sellers to sell at 
high prices. Max-U is achieved simultaneously for all buyers and sellers at 
the competitive market clearing price where the quantity sellers could 
profitably sell equaled the quantity buyers could profitably buy. 
Trading in the experimental market is organized using the two-sided 
"double auction'' procedure common in early commodity and securities 
market trading. Buyers announce bids to buy, sellers announce asks to sell, 
with contracts effected either by a buyer accepting the lowest ask price, or 
a seller accepting the highest bid price. From the first experiments down to 
the present day, these markets converge quite rapidly and robustly to the 
competitive equilibrium price under repetitions across time. This victory for 
the application of Max-U theory to markets is somewhat marred, however, 
in that Jevons believed that such results only obtain if all participants in the 
market have complete and perfect information on supply and demand and 
therefore the clearing price. But in the experiments, each buyer and seller 
possess only private decentralized information on the small fragment of the 
total supply and demand that defined their part of the overall market. 
Consequently, the experimental results not only confirm the efficacy of 
Max-U to markets but under far weaker conditions than Jevons, and the 
generations of economists that followed him, thought necessary. 
Jevons and neoclassical economists erred in thinking that the partici-
pants in markets needed the same information that Max-U theorists 
needed to compute an equilibrium. In effect they impose their mental 
model of market outcomes on the behavior of the market participants. 
Adam Smith did not make this error in either Sentiments or Wealth. His 
modeling perspective is first that of the actor, her feelings, reactions and 
11 William Stanley Jevons (1862, 1871) was particularly influential in the English-speaking 
world in propagating the Max-U calculus of supply and demand theory. From Richard 
Howey (1989), we learn that in 1862 Jevons sent his paper "Notice of a General 
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science; though the paper was read, only a short abstract was published 
in the proceedings. But the event clearly established Jevons's priority for the first articu-
lation of the marginal utility and general equilibrium theories that became part of the 
1870s neoclassical revolution. Serendipitously, Smith (1962) published experimental tests 
of supply-and-demand theory on the centenary year of Jevons's contribution. 
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interactions, and second the consequences for society or economy of that 
perspective. 
Max-U in the neoclassical vision is proffered not only as a theory of 
markets but as the modeling foundation for all human decision-making. 
The model fails decisively to predict the extent of cooperation in the study 
of two-person interactive games, including ultimatum and trust games, 
beginning in the 1980s and popular in laboratory experiments ever since the 
l 990s.12 Sentiments reconciles the discordant results between market and 
two-person interactive experiments, and provides fresh insight into the 
observed personal social conduct in the two-person games. Smith was not 
a utilitarian in the neoclassical sense of Max-U. (In what follows we use 
((utilitarian" in the sense of pertaining to utility, not in the sense of pertaining 
to the philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism.) For Smith ((self-love" is 
necessarily at the core of our being, but in the responsible individual's prudent 
maturation, conduct is shaped by learnt other-regarding rules of social order 
originating in our capacity for mutual sympathetic fellow-feeling. 
Behavioral and experimental economists offered other ways of reconciling 
the predictive failures of Max-U in the form of "social preference" and 
"reciprocity" theories.13 Since neither of these ex post resolutions are appro-
priate for characterizing Smith's model, Sentiments deserves our careful 
attention if we are to understand why and how modern thinking turned 
away from the classical tradition, ill-preparing us for the disruptive discov-
eries in two-person interactive games. It is an error common to the modern 
mind to suppose that any insightful earlier conceptual breakthrough in 
understanding must surely have been integrated into the subsequent litera-
ture. Indeed many of the insights in Sentiments were subsequently discov-
ered, and the psychology of sentiment has been independently reevaluated.14 
But we will show that the model in Sentiments - the thought framework - is 
distinctive and relevant for a twenty-first-century social science of human 
beings. 
MODELING HUMAN ACTION 
A good place to start in getting a grasp on Smith's model and manner of 
thinking is to examine his opening sentence: "How selfish soever man may 
12 For summaries, see Colin Camerer (2003, chapters 1, 2) and Smith (2008b, chapters 10, 
11, 12). 
13 See, e.g., Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2008) and Kevin McCabe, Mary 
Rigdon, and Vernon Smith (2003). 
14 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Cass Sunstein (2005). 
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be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it" 
(TMS, First.I.I., p. 3).15 For economists trained in the neoclassical utilitar-
ian tradition and the psychologists influenced by it, "pleasure" automati-
cally implies utility, while a concern for the fortune (and happiness) of 
others is about altruism. Smith is neither a utilitarian in the modern sense, 
nor is he writing here about altruism. The word altruism did not enter the 
English language for another century.16 Smith's conception of "pleasure" 
refers to the feeling of something good, not the mere ordinal ranking of 
alternatives meant by modern utility maximization. In Smith's model, we 
feel good about "mutual sympathy," which is being in a harmonious or 
resonant relationship with others. Smith's relationship involves what the 
modern reader would call "mutual empathy" although the word empathy 
would not enter English for another 150 years. Empathy involves a capacity 
to comprehend by your imagination what you would feel if you were in 
another person's situation. But Smith's use of "fellow feeling" is especially 
self-evident in conveying the meaning we want to capture, and we will use 
his phrase. Here is a modern translation of the opening sentence that draws 
on explanations as we see them subsequently developed in Sentiments: 
However selfish we assume people to be, our capacity for mutual fellow 
feeling guides us in learning context-dependent rules of conduct that 
enable us to live in harmony with others. 
Smith's most basic axiom in Sentiments is the Stoic principle of self-love, 
that each person is best qualified to be concerned with, and to manage, his 
own care (TMS, Second.II.II, p. 119; Seventh.II.II, p. 402; Seventh.II.III, 
p. 445). This axiom, known as non-satiated preferences in modern choice 
theory, did not lead Smith to base individual actions on some version of 
utility maximization. How did Smith avoid the seemingly obvious neoclas-
sical implication of non-satiation a la Jeremy Bentham, William Stanley 
Jevons, Paul Samuelson, and modern game theory? Why did he not model 
human decisions as choosing actions to maximize utility? From our study 
of Sentiments we infer that in Smith's vision, common knowledge of self-
love is what enables each person to judge from the context whether, and for 
15 Our notation for citing TMS is "Part.Section.Chapter, p. page(s)," for the Part, Section, 
and Chapters explicitly numbered in the text. Sections or chapters that are implied but not 
explicitly numbered as such in TMS are denoted in parentheses, e.g. Third.(I).VI, p. 250. 
16 To be precise, altruism entered the English language in 1852. Thomas Dixon (2008) offers 
a brilliant detailed study ofhow the word entered the English lexicon and how the concept 
has been evolving ever since. 
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whom, an action is beneficial or hurtful. An action is beneficial if it awards 
more of a resource (money, goods, or services) to another, and an action is 
hurtful if it provides less of a resource for another. The context of an action 
is essential because the resulting outcomes can only acquire meaning 
relative to the available decision alternatives defined by the context. For 
a person who is concerned only with maximizing her own reward, infor-
mation concerning what benefits or hurts others is entirely irrelevant, and 
the context of an action has no significance as a signal sent by the decision-
maker or to be read by other persons like themselves. In contrast, Smith's 
idea is that each of us, tacitly knowing that everyone strictly prefers more, 
and strictly dis-prefers less, is in a position thereby to judge the beneficial 
or hurtful intent of a person's action relative to alternatives that might be 
chosen. Consequently, actions are messages, part of a conversation, to be 
read as signals, responded to as signals, and in Smith such exchanges 
constitute the foundations of human sociability. 
In this model, context or circumstances is a core feature of interactive 
decisions. Retrospectively, this is highly significant because in the 1980s and 
1990s when experimental economists and cognitive psychologists observed 
widespread and replicable deviations from self-interested choices in two-
person games like the ultimatum game, their explorations designed to find 
out why these had occurred soon established that context mattered greatly.
17 
Indeed, varying context seems to have a far bigger and more diverse impact 
on observed decisions than varying payoff levels. These results were con-
sistent with the model in Sentiments, but Smith's framework was not part of 
our mode of thinking. The mechanism in Sentiments that causes context to 
matter, that tempers and modifies the decision not to blindly follow one's 
own utility maximization, is social. Each person adaptively learns to respond 
in ways that ((humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to 
something which other men can go along with" (TMS, Second.II.II, p. 120). 
Social maturation involves learning to follow rules that satisfy fitness norms 
or conventions that control the inconsiderate pursuit of one's self-interest. 
Conducting one's self in an other-regarding manner is the result of exerting 
the ((self-command" necessary to build, service, and maintain social capital. 
Such learning is internalized as ethical, self-governing action. 
Smith's socializing uses the common knowledge that everyone is self-
loving to judge the propriety of conduct that is socially fit, and thereby 
17 For example, Smith's (2008b) chapter 10 is entitled "The Effect of Context on Behavior," 
but the theme derives from experimental findings not from theory and not from 
Sentiments. 
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pursuing his own interest. For Smith there is no unresolved observed 
contradiction between people pursuing their own interest, say in money, 
and choosing actions that are other-regarding. One's own interest includes 
living harmoniously and ethically with others, and choosing socially fit 
actions. Sentiments provides a framework that well prepares us to examine 
and study context, to understand social process, and that directs us away 
from a focus only on outcomes and their payoffs whose social meaning can 
only be derived from the context. Although the intellectual route has been 
much different, such a focus on the consequences of actions describes 
much of the recent history of piecemeal learning in experimental econom-
ics. Sentiments, we contend, integrates our modern relearning into 
a consistent whole. Smith's model is consistent with the modern findings 
in experimental economics and does not require modification in the light 
of evidence. Sentiments does, however, require a contemporary interpreta-
tion in its applications to modern findings. 
The core message we develop from Sentiments is that humans are other-
regarding in their personal interactions because we learn to follow rules of 
conduct that permit us to live in the company of our fellow human 
beings.18 Such rules are situation-sensitive to the effect of our actions on 
the benefits and hurts of others, as well as to our own self. The human 
capacity for fellow feeling, in particular for mutual fellow feeling, is the 
primary mechanism through which we are socialized creatures. Without 
such innate capabilities, honed as practiced skills, there would be no 
human sociality in Smith's world. We are not other-regarding because 
we reductively prefer to be social, but through human empathy we come, as 
Robert Burns puts it, to "see oursels as ithers see us." In plain and 
unmistakably clear language Smith says: "Though it may be true ... that 
every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all man-
kind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts 
according to this principle" (TMS, Second.II.II, p.120). 
Here is the logic of Smith's system in Sentiments, as we interpret, 
develop, and apply it in this book: People have common knowledge that 
all are self-interested and are locally non-satiated - more is always better, 
less is always worse from any reference state. Otherwise, we cannot be 
socially competent rule-followers because we cannot be sensitive to who 
benefits or who is hurt by our actions, and to properly balance concern for 
18 Smith's model allows for diverse cultural adaptations since how others see us is subject to 
cultural variation even within Western European societies and their global extension, but 
this theme is beyond the scope of systematic exploration in this work. 
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ourselves and concern for others. Our rule-following judgments are highly 
context dependent. The situation, and the pattern of benefits or hurts, 
together effect the action chosen. What enables such sociability is our 
capacity for mutual fellow-feeling; we cannot reach maturity without 
being shaped to a highly variable extent by our experience of others and 
the mark they leave on our development. Our desire for praise and 
praiseworthiness, and to avoid blame and blameworthiness emerges from 
this maturation. Smith's model leads to key propositions on intentional 
acts of beneficence and injustice that invoke corresponding thoughts and 
feelings of gratitude and resentment. 
HUME, SMITH, AND UTILITARIANISM 
In an important passage, Smith cites Hume's appeal to utility (usefulness) 
as a principal cause of human sentiments. Smith, however, disavows utility 
as the source of conscious individual motivation, though it may have the 
effect of utilitarian efficiency (TMS, Fourth.(I).II, pp. 270-71, our italics): 
The same ingenious and agreeable author [David Hume] who first explained why 
utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole 
approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from 
the appearance of utility. No qualities of the mind he observes, are ap~roved of as 
virtuous, but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to 
others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary 
tendency. And Nature, indeed, seems to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the in~ividual an~ ~f 
the society, that after the strictest examination it will be found, I believe, that this is 
universally the case.19 But still I [Adam Smith] affirm, that it is not the view of t~is 
utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of ou~ approbation 
and disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the 
perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utili~ or hurtft~.lness. 
But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception. 
Smith's explanation of conduct is always rooted in mutual fellow feeling. 
Only after we understand how individuals experience each other should we 
enquire after its efficacy for the individual and society. Hume was close to 
the neoclassical utilitarian tradition; Smith was not. The philosopher 
19 Smith does not disagree with Hume, that human action will be efficient, will maximize 
utilitarian welfare, but that does not explain why people choose the actions they do. Smith 
wants carefully to distinguish the actions that people take based on how they see and 
experience the world, from the larger ends their actions may achieve. It is a version of t~e 
invisible hand metaphor. People achieve ecologically rational ends not part of their 
intentions or prevision. 
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Samuel Alexander's clear-eyed but forgotten, early twentieth-century sum-
mary states what separated Hume and Smith, and that which we seek to 
develop in this book (1933, p. 249, our italics): 
Like the utilitarians who came after him, ... [Hume] looked ultimately to the 
effects of action in the way of giving pleasure or pain. Adam Smith, with a surer eye, 
declared the sympathy which determines our approbation or disapprobation, not 
so much to be directed towards the effects of actions as to the impulses from which 
the action proceeds. He considered our actions in their origin rather than in their 
outcome. 
THE CIVIL ORDER OF PROPERTY EVOLVED 
FROM THE SOCIAL ORDER OF PROPRIETY 
Property in its modern use means ownership, or something that carries 
with it a right to exclude and have unrivaled access to for one's own 
individual or social purposes. More fundamentally "ownership" is 
derived from expectations established by consent. We commonly 
think of property as having its origin in the civil order of government. 
Strong cultural traditions, including trade, however, are far older than 
nations, and we must expect property to have ancient origins in social 
rules like "thou shalt not steal, bear false witness, or covet the posses-
sions of thy neighbor.>' Stealing and lying are hurtful to others, and 
coveting corrupts our moral capacity for self-command. The origins of 
the social order of propriety were in human sentiment, and the prac-
ticed norms of the social order naturally underpinned the rules of 
property. 
Concerning the origins of property, it is informative that in the century 
before Smith wrote, scholars used the words propriety and property inter-
changeably. Propriety and property are both descendants of the Anglo-
N orman proprete, the Old French propriete, and the Latin proprietas. 
Proprietas itself is derivative of the ancient adverb proprie, meaning "exclu-
sively, particularly, peculiarly, and properly."20 Whereas John Locke used 
propriety in the early version of Two Treatises of Government, in many 
instances he changes to the use of property in later revisions.21 
In Sentiments the rules that apply to human conduct govern the propriety 
20 
Prior to the time of Sir Edward Coke, English lawyers used proprietas, proprete, and 
property interchangeably in disputes about chattels. For detailed discussion and refer-
ences, see Bart Wilson (2017). 
21 See Stephen Buckle (1991, pp. 172-73). 
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of individual actions (Part First of Sentiments is entitled "Of the Propriety 
of Action"), and conduct is expressed in actions governed by consensus. 
Smith always refers explicitly to the propriety or impropriety of intentional 
action. The laws of justice, including property, in the civil order of govern-
ment evolve directly from the conventions governing the propriety of 
everyday action. The impropriety of hurtful actions is met with resent-
ment, and the resentment brings measured punishment responses in 
retaliation: "As the greater and more irreparable the evil that is done, the 
resentment of the sufferer runs naturally the higher" (TMS, Second.II.II, 
p. 121). 
Hence, in the civil order, justice is attained through sanctions aimed at 
punishing the perpetrator, and thereby avenging the natural resentment of 
the victim, wherever the laws of justice are breached. 22 Prevent or avenge 
intentionally hurtful acts of injustice, and you achieve justice. For Smith 
the "laws of justice" are negative. They specify actions that are unjust and 
subject to resentful retaliation if infractions occur. People have wide liberty 
to take any action that is not unjust. Imagine society as a large playing field 
within which people are free to pursue their own aspirations, careers, and 
business plans as they choose but governed always by rules that prohibit 
and recompense foul play. Any outcome of action - mediocrity, success, 
failure, riches, admiration - is acceptable so long as no fouls are com-
mitted. The individual is free to excel, as in a race, but not to cheat or lie or 
jostle others in the race. 
PROPERTY, THE PROPENSITY TO EXCHANGE, 
AND WEALTH CREATION 
Smith develops the foundation for understanding economic development 
in Sentiments. Property - the universal human custom of mutually recog-
nizing what is mine and thine - is necessary but not sufficient, and in 
Wealth he adds a key axiom: The human "propensity to truck, barter and 
exchange." Just as disinterested commerce underlies the social order, 
Smith's axiom is simply an extension of human sociability to interested 
22 Note that the punishment response to acts of injustice is not utilitarian, distinguishing 
Smith's jurisprudence from modern law and behavioral law and economics (Fabrizio 
Simon 2016). As in Alexander, quoted above, the origin of the hurtful act was an 
intentional violation of fair play; the resentment of the victim (the origin of what offends) 
must be recompensed. Smith says it is the resentment and the impulse to punish in return 
that is addressed by the rules we follow; relationships are about not committing fouls, 
achieving justice by fair play. 
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commerce; it is "commerce" all the way up, from neighborly social 
exchange to the extended order of impersonal markets.23 
In the neoclassical tradition, the modern economic model begins with 
dispersed information on preferences, resources, and technology, then 
applies Max-U to deduce prices and allocations. In Wealth the primi-
tives are not tastes, costs, and technology, but the observed human 
propensity to trade, a propensity founded on two people improving 
their own non-satiated condition by exchanging one thing for another 
in but another social and ethical interaction. An immediate conse-
quence of trading is new information prices that people experience, 
observe, or learn about through gossip. Price information allows indi-
viduals to make comparisons between what is and what might be. 
A price for corn and for hogs allows the individual producer, based 
on his local circumstances, to ask if he can benefit by producing more 
hogs and less corn. In principle, as in modern preference theory based 
on perfect complete-ordering information, he could make any such 
comparison without prices, but it would be cognitively far more com-
plex without prices to ease the mental calculus of comparison. Do I get 
more corn by growing it or through pig-corn exchange, selling pigs and 
buying corn? The formation of prices enables him better to discover 
preferences and costs through experience, and to seek information that 
is relevant for decision and innovation. Across markets and nationally, 
such discovery leads to labor specialization - a fundamental source of 
wealth creation. Although people intend their own benefit, the laws of 
justice channel their actions to enable others and the nation to 
prosper.24 
In both Sentiments and Wealth action is driven by discovery in a world 
of uncertainty and consequences that are unknown until attempted: 
through repeat social interactions and trade, people adapt their responses 
to better themselves as well as others through gains from exchange. 
Experimental economists observe such a process every time we conduct 
23 If you doubt the claim, consider the breadth of meanings of commerce listed in the 
dictionary, which in the Oxford English Dictionary include: (la) exchange between 
men of the products of nature or art, buying and selling together; (2a) intercourse in 
the affairs of life, dealings; (2c) intercourse or converse with God, with spirits, passions, 
thoughts, etc.; and (3) intercourse of the sexes; esp. in a bad sense [which is proper British 
for "sex"]. 
24 Bernard Mandeville, who irreverently founded economic decision-making on the vice of 
self-love in The Fable of the Bees, and whose satirical, tongue-in-cheek humor scandalized 
Smith, nevertheless still concluded: "So Vice is beneficial found, I When it is by Justice 
lopt and bound" (1705). 
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a market experiment.25 What was already articulated in SU:ith's twoc~ooks 
could be summarized elegantly by Hayek over two centuries later: Rules 
alone can unite an extended order .... Neither all ends pursued, nor all 
means used, are known or need be known to anybody, in order for them to 
be taken account of within a spontaneous order. Such an order forms of 
itself' (1988, pp. 19-20). 
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